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I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most exciting and dramatic aspects of trial are the closing
arguments. Passion and emotion can aid in persuading a jury to return a
favorable verdict, but a "win at all costs" mind-set can lead to reversal on
appeal.! Unfortunately, some attorneys continue to ignore the Supreme
Court of Florida's decisions on the use of improper closing arguments.
1. See Gore v. State, 719 So. 2d 1197,1203 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Ryan v. State, 457 So.
2d 1084, 1091 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1984)) (reversing and commenting that the "prosecutor's
'over zealousness in prosecuting the State's cause worked against justice, rather than for it");
Hoggins v. State, 718 So. 2d 761, 772 (Fla. 1998) (reversing in part because prosecutor made
prohibited comments on defendant's post-Miranda silence during rebuttal closing argument);
D'Ambrosio v. State, 736 So. 2d 44, 48 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing because
prosecutor repeatedly referred to the defendant's defense as innuendo, speculation, and a sea of
confusion); Milburn v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1936, D1937 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 1999)
(reversing because prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof regarding insanity defense);
Barnes v. State, 743 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that prosecutor's
disparaging statement of defense counsel constituted fundamental error and warranted reversal of
the conviction); Izquierdo v. State, 724 So. 2d 124, 125 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1998) (vacating
and remanding because the prosecutor "referred to the defense as a 'pathetic fantasy' and
"improperly appealed to the jurors sympathy"); Freeman v. State, 717 So. 2d 105, 105-06 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing because prosecutor improperly bolstered credibility of police
officers); Boyer v. State, 713 So. 2d 1133, 1133-34 n.1 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1998) (reversing
because prosecutor "accus[ed] the defendant of suborning the perjury of a defense witness... [;]
personally express[ed] his belief that the defendant was guilty;... vouch[ed] for the credibility of
a state witness;... appeal[ed] to the jury's sympathy and emotions; and... call[ed] the
defendant and the defendant's witness liars"); Miller v. State, 712 So. 2d 451, 452-53 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing because prosecutor's closing argument ridiculed the defendant's
voluntary intoxication defense and misstated the law); Baker v. State, 705 So. 2d 139, 139 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing because prosecutor's comments implied that "defense counsel
was fishing for gullible jurors" was an improper comment and was not "an invited response to
defense counsel's proper closing argument").
2. See Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 422 (Fla. 1998); Campbell v. State, 679 So. 2d
720, 724 (Fla. 1996); Richardson v. State, 604 So. 2d 1107, 1109 (Fla. 1992); Rhodes v. State,
547 So. 2d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 1989); Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 356 (Fla. 1988); Bertolotti v.
State, 476 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1985).
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Attorney misconduct3 may occur during discovery,4 voir dire,5 or
6
examination of witnesses. However, this article will focus solely on miscon-
duct that occurs during closing arguments, discuss selected civil and criminal
cases decided by Florida courts in 1998 and 1999, and also address earlier
cases that are important to the issue.
II. THE LAWYER' S PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
CONDUCT DURING TRIAL
Come to law as a process, not with the sole purpose of winning
every cause, but instead with a strong dedication to the rule of law.
Make your client's case in the best way permitted by our law and
ethics, but with the civility and personal restraint that marks the
best of our profession. Return to the understanding that our pro-
fessional role is most concerned with the process and with the
belief that if we make the best case within the law and ethics, the
probability is that the right result will be reached. Come back to
law as a process.
Look upon your role as that of a teacher, who will lead the court
through the legal thicket. And then, just as Virgil left Dante, leave
all legal proceedings with an air of grace, with an indelible
perception of all that is good in legal advocacy. Leave your
audience with a lasting impression of your dedication, not to the
goal of victory above all else in the trial or hearing, but instead of
an abiding deference to the rule of law, to the canons and ethics of
professionalism, to the constraints and limits of circumstance and
3. Misconduct, "when applied to an act of [an] attorney, implies dishonest act or
attempt to persuade court or jury by use of deceptive or reprehensible methods." BLACK'S LAW
DICrIoNARY 901 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted). Misconduct of counsel means "[tihe conduct
of counsel... which prevents the adverse party from having a fair trial, consisting in improper
remarks, comments, or arguments .... " BALLANr 's LAW DicroNARY (3d ed. 1969) available
in LEXIS, Reference Library, General File. Professional misconduct means "[c]onduct that tends
to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public."
BALLANTINE'S LAw DICIONARY (3d ed. 1969) available in LEXIS, Reference Library, General
File.
4. See McArthur v. State, 671 So. 2d 867, 870 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (reversing
where the State provided inaccurate and misleading information concerning the test results of the
victim's clothing).
5. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Dewberry, 383 So. 2d 1109, 1109 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL
App. 1978) (reversing where insured's counsel made repeated references to the amount of policy
limits during voir dire).
6. See Boatwright v. State, 452 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fia. 4th Dist. CL App. 1984)
(reversing because the prosecutor asked a witness whether the prior witnesses had lied).
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the primary codes of human conduct. Do that and there is a chance
that we can erase the current low image of our profession and
restore ourselves once again in the minds of fairminded people
everywhere that ours is still the profession that gave the world a
Thomas Moore, an Abraham Lincoln, a Louis Brandeis, and [a]
Thurgood Marshall.7
The Florida Bar has 65,445 members who represent all lawyers licensed
to practice in Florida.8 One of the basic purposes of The Florida Bar is to
assure high standards of professionalism in the practice of law for the benefit
of the public.9 Rule 4-3.4(e) of the Florida Rules of Professional Conductl°
provides that: A lawyer shall not:
[I]n trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably
believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible
evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when
testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness
of a cause, the credibility of a witness, tht culpability of a civil
litigant, or the guilt or innocence of an accused.'
Rule 4-3.4(c) provides that a lawyer shall not "knowingly disobey an
obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on
an assertion that no valid obligation exists."'* Additionally, rule 4-3.5(a)
states that "[a] lawyer shall not seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective
juror, or other decision maker except as permitted by law or the rules of
court."'
13
All lawyers who are members of The Florida Bar, or otherwise
authorized to practice in any court of the State of Florida, must abide by the
Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.14  Additionally, the McDade Amend-
ment,1s provides that "[a]n attorney for the Government 16 shall be subject to
7. Honorable Gary M. Farmer, Keynote Address at the Nova Law Review Annual
Banquet (Mar. 20, 1999), reprinted in Honorable Gary M. Farmer, Civility and Professionalism
in LegalAdvocacy, 23 NOVA L. REv. 809, 816-17 (1999).
8. Frequently Asked Questions (visited July 27, 1999) <http://www.flabar.org>.
9. Id.
10. The Rules of Professional Conduct are found in chapter four of the Rules Regulating
The Florida Bar.
11. FLA. R. PROF. CoNDucT 4-3.4(e).
12. Id. at R. 4-3.4(c).
13. Id. at R. 4-3.5(a).
14. Id. at preamble.
15. Codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 530B (West Supp. 1999).
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State laws and rules, and local Federal court rules governing attorneys in
each State where such attorney engages in that attorney's duties, to the same
extent and in the same manner as other attorneys in that State. ' 7 Thus,
federal prosecutors and public defenders must abide by the Rules Regulating
The Florida Bar even if he or she is not a member of The Florida Bar.
Ill. THE REQUIREMENT TO REPORT ETHICAL VIOLATIONS TO
THE FLORIDA BAR
Lawyers have an obligation to report ethical violations to The Florida
Bar.18 Rule 4-8.3(a) states that "[a] lawyer having knowledge that another
lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that
raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the appropriate professional
authority."' 9
Judges also have a responsibility to act accordingly when confronted with
unethical conduct.2° The Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[a] judge who
receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that a lawyer has
committed a violation of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar should take
appropriate action."2' The Code pJudicial Conduct does not specify what the
term "appropriate action" means. The Fifth District Court of Appeal recently
stated that a trial judge, "in the case of lawyers who do not heed less severe
judicial efforts to correct such conduct... ,"2 should refer the matter to The
Florida Bar.
24
A complaint against a Florida lawyer for unethical conduct is a serious
matter. When an attorney makes an unethical improper argument during
closing argument, The Florida Bar can enforce its rules through its
16. An '"attorney for the Government' includes any attorney described in section 77.2(a)
of part 77 of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations and also includes any independent
counsel, or employee of such a counsel, appointed under chapter 40." 28 U.S.C.A. § 530B(c).
17. l § 530B(a).
18. FLA. R. PROF. CoNDucr 4-8.3(a).
19. Id. at R. 4-8.3(a) (emphasis added).
20. MODELCODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3D(2) (1998).
21. 1l
22. Id.
23. Fravel v. Haughey, 727 So. 2d 1033, 1036 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
24. See also Izquierdo v. State, 724 So. 2d 124, 125 n.1 (referring the prosecutor to The
Florida Bar where it was the third time the Third District Court of Appeal had been "forced to
deal with his indulgence in what is often euphemistically called 'overzealous advocacy,' but
[was] really just unprofessional and unethical behavior").
Tobin
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disciplinary process. "Discipline... can range from an admonishment to
suspension from the practice of law for a definite or indefinite period of
time, or disbarment." 26  Negative consequences may arise even if the
conduct does not degenerate to the level of unethical conduct because
"[c]ourts are often critical of trial conduct even if they do not find that it
rises to the level of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct."27
Moreover, attorney misconduct often becomes the focus of adverse media
attention. 28
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Section 924.33 of the Florida Statutes provides that "[n]o judgment
shall be reversed unless the appellate court is of the opinion, after an
examination of all the appeal papers, that error was committed that
injuriously affected the substantial rights of the appellant. It shall not be
presumed that error injuriously affected the substantial rights of the
appellant." 29
Improper comments during closing arguments are subject to the
harmless error rule as provided in section 59.041 of the Florida Statute:
No judgment shall be set aside or reversed, or new trial granted
by any court of the state in any cause, civil or criminal, on the
ground of misdirection of the jury or the improper admission or
rejection of evidence or for error as to any matter of pleading or
procedure, unless in the opinion of the court to which application is
made, after an examination of the entire case it shall appear that the
25. Id. at 125.
26. Complaint Against A Florida Lawyer (visited Sept. 21, 1999) <http:llwww.
flabar.org>.
27. Timothy P. Chinaris & Elizabeth Clark Tarbert, Professional Responsibility: 1998
Survey of Florida Law, 23 NOVA L. REV. 162, 205 (1998). See also Copertino v. State, 726 So.
2d 330, 334 n.2 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, 735 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 1999)
(stating that the "prosecutor engaged in conduct throughout the trial suggesting too much a
personal interest in winning, rather than detached advocacy for the state"); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Sommers, 717 So. 2d 178, 178 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (describing plaintiffs' attorney as
lacking "verbal dexterity").
28. See Carol Marbin Miller, Appeals Court Urges Bar Discipline of Trash-Talking
Broward Prosecutor, DAILY Buspn;ss REvIEw, Feb. 25, 1999, at Al (outlining history of
Broward County prosecutor's inappropriate comments during trials); The Road to Hell is Paved
with Lawyer Jokes, CIy LuN, Feb. 24-Mar. 2, 1999, at 9 (discussing a Broward prosecutor's
"penchant" for making disparaging comments about opposing counsel during closing arguments).
29. FLA. STAT. § 924.33 (1999).
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error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. This
section shall be liberally construed.3°
In State v. DiGuiio,31 the Supreme Court of Florida stated that the
harmless error test "places the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the
error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did
not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no
reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. 3 2 The
Supreme Court of Florida has cautioned that the "harmless error analysis
must not become a device whereby the appellate court substitutes itself for
the jury, examines the permissible evidence, excludes the impermissible
evidence, and determines that the evidence of guilt is sufficient or even
overwhelming based on the permissible evidence. 33  In DiGuilio, the
Supreme Court of Florida pointed out that:
[o]verwhelming evidence of guilt does not negate the fact that an
error that constituted a substantial part of the prosecution's case
may have played a substantial part in the jury's deliberation and
thus contributed to the actual verdict reached, for the jury may have
reached its verdict because of the error without considering other
reasons untainted by error that would have supported the same
result.
34
Where the error is not constitutional in nature, section 924.051(7) of the
Florida Statutes governs and the burden will be upon the defendant to show
prejudice. 35
In a direct appeal or a collateral proceeding, the party challenging
the judgment or order of the trial court has the burden of
demonstrating that a prejudicial error 6 occurred in the trial court.
A conviction or sentence may not be reversed absent an express
finding that a prejudicial error occurred in the trial court. 37
30. FLA. STAT. § 59.041 (1999).
31. 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986).
32. Id. at 1135 (articulating harmless error test established by quoting Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
33. Id. at 1136.
34. Id (quoting People v. Ross, 429 P.2d 606,621 (1967) (Traynor, J. dissenting)).
35. FLA. STAT. § 924.051(7) (1999).
36. Prejudicial error is defined as "an error in the trial court that harmfully affected the
judgment or sentence." Md § 924.051(1)(a).
37. Id § 924.051(7).
Tobin
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V. INVITED RESPONSE DOCTRINE
In United States v. Young, 38 the United States Supreme Court explained
the Invited Response Doctrine:
[D]efense counsel argues improperly, provoking the prosecutor to
respond in kind, and the trial judge takes no corrective action.
Clearly two improper arguments-two apparent wrongs--do not
make for a right result. Nevertheless, a criminal conviction is not
to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments
standing alone, for the statements or conduct must be viewed in
context; only by so doing can it be determined whether the
prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial. To help
resolve this problem, courts have invoked what is sometimes called
the "invited response" or "invited reply" rule.
[T]he Court must consider the probable effect the prosecutor's
response would have on the jury's ability to judge the evidence
fairly. In this context, defense counsel's conduct, as well as the
nature of the prosecutor's response, is relevant.
[T]he reviewing court must not only weigh the impact of the
prosecutor's remarks, but must also take into account defense
counsel's opening salvo. Thus the import of the evaluation has
been that if the prosecutor's remarks were "invited," and did no
more than respond substantially in order to "right the scale," such
comments would not warrant reversing a conviction.
39
Florida courts have refused to reverse convictions where they found the
prosecutor was merely making a fair reply to the defendant's own closing
argument.4 0 It is important to note that a prosecutor must object to improper
comments by defense counsel at the time defense counsel makes them in
order for the trial judge to impose timely restrictions on defense counsel.4'
The Invited Response Doctrine "does not contemplate that a prosecutor will
38. 470 U.S. 1 (1985).
39. Id. at 11-13.
40. See Ferguson v. State, 417 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1982); St. Jean v. State, 721 So. 2d 448
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Kent v. State, 702 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997), review
denied 717 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1998); Meeks v. State, 667 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
41. Fryer v. State, 693 So. 2d 1046, 1051 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (Sorondo, J.,
concurring specially).
[Vol. 24:35
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sit silently while defense counsel pursues an impermissible line of argument
so that he or she can then pursue his or her own impermissible and highly
prejudicial response."42
In Dix v. State,43 the defendant was charged and convicted of
aggravated battery by shooting the victim in the chest. 4 During opening
statement and closing argument, defense counsel argued the shooting was an
accident. 45 The defendant did not testify at trial, but an eyewitness testified
at trial about the shooting and about his conversation with the defendant
while they were both in jail.'4 During closing argument, the prosecutor
stated the eyewitness asked the defendant why he shot him, and the
defendant replied he had a beef with the victim and did not like him.47 The
prosecutor then argued the shooting was not an accident.48 Defense counsel
moved for a new trial and argued that the prosecutor commented on the
burden of proof and on the defendant's right to remain silent.49 The circuit
court granted the defendant's motion for new trial and the State appealed.
50
The Fifth District Court of Appeal said the State had a right and a duty
to respond to the explanation of the charges given by the defense because to
ignore the defense would give it credence.5 1 The court concluded the
prosecutor did not refer to the absence of any testimony by the defendant.52
The court found the prosecutor had merely commented on the defendant's
statement to the eyewitness and compared that statement to the accident
defense asserted by defense counsel.53 The Fifth District reversed the trial
court's order granting a new trial, and directed the trial court to enter a
judgment on the jury verdict and sentence. 54
42. Id.
43. 723 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
44. Id. at 352.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Dix, 723 So. 2d at 352.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Dix, 723 So. 2d at 352.
54. Id.
Tobin
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VI. PRESERVING THE ISSUE FOR APPEAL
The law is clear that absent a contemporaneous objection improper
comments during closing argument are not cognizable on appeal. A timely
objection allows the trial court an opportunity to give a curative instruction
or admonish counsel. 56 "The only exception to this blanket procedural bar is
where the comment constitutes fundamental error. ' 57  Notably, Florida's
district courts of appeal are divided on the concept of fundamental error.58
In Pait v. State,59 the Supreme Court of Florida explained that some
unobjected-to comments may be so prejudicial that they warrant a new trial:
55. Wal-Mart Stores v. Gutierrez, 731 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999);
Gutierrez v. State, 731 So. 2d 94, 95 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Kelly v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins., 720 So. 2d 1145, 1147 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1998); King v. Byrd, 716 So. 2d 831,
836 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411,418 n.8 (Fla. 1998).
56. Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336, 1340 (Fla. 1990).
57. Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 418 n.8 (Fla. 1998). See Street v. State, 636 So. 2d
1297 (Fla. 1994); Eichelkraut v. Kash N' Karry Food Stores, 644 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1994); Wasden v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 474 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1985).
58. See Wal-Mart Stores v. Gutierrez, 731 So. 2d 151, 151-52 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (finding that unobjected-to comments "were not so prejudicial or inflammatory as to
constitute fundamental error"); Gutierrez v. State, 731 So. 2d 94, 95 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App.
1999) (holding that an "improper comment on a defendant's right to remain silent is not
fundamental error which may be raised on appeal without an objection at trial'; Henderson v.
State, 727 So. 2d 284, 285-86 (Fla. 2d Dist Ct. App. 1999) (holding that where the prosecutor
argued that the defendant "would not know the truth if it hit him up side the head," that an
acquittal would mean that the witnesses were "all a pack of liars," and that the defendant had
invented a "fairy tale" did not constitute fundamental error and the defendant waived review by
failing to object); Ross v. State, 726 So. 2d 317, 319 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1998) (finding that
although the defense failed to object when the prosecutor called the defendant and defense
witnesses "pathetic," "insulting," "preposterous," "nonsense," and "bologna," the court found the
repeated comments constituted fundamental error); Bell v. State, 723 So. 2d 896, 897 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that where the prosecutor vouched for an officer's testimony, told
the jury to send a message, argued matters not in evidence, and commented on the defendant's
exercise of his right to a jury trial, the court found the comments did not constitute fundamental
error); Freeman v. State, 717 So. 2d 105, 105-06 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (finding where
the prosecutor's improper bolstering of a police officer's testimony and mention of an officer's
funeral in the newspaper together with other improper remarks rose to the level of fundamental
error); DeFreitas v. State, 701 So. 2d 593, 600-01 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1997) (holding
numerous acts of prosecutorial misconduct were of such a nature and character that the
cumulative and collective effect rose to the level of fundamental error); Knight v. State, 672 So.
2d 590, 590-91 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that prosecutor's verbal attacks on
defense counsel, arguing facts not in evidence, and bolstering the credibility of a police officer's
testimony constituted fundamental error).
59. 112 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1959).
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[W]hen an improper remark to the jury can be said to be so pre-
judicial to the rights of an accused that neither rebuke nor
retraction could eradicate its evil influence, then it may be con-
sidered as a ground for reversal despite the absence of an oblection
below, or even in the presence of a rebuke by the trial judge.
Once a proper objection has been made, objecting counsel must move
for a mistrial to preserve the issue for appeal . The motion for mistrial may
be made as late as the end of closing argument, thus avoiding interruption in
the continuity of the argument and allowing an opportunity to evaluate the
prejudicial nature of the objectionable remarks in the context of the entire
argument.62 However, where the objection is overruled, requiring a motion
for mistrial is purposeless because "[t]he objection itself calls the court's
attention to the error alleged to have prejudiced the party making the
objection and to the possibility that a mistrial may be in order."63
VII. CLOSING ARGUMENT
Closing argument is the trial attorney's final opportunity "to argue the
facts in evidence and/or reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom." 6
However, this is not a license for an attorney to argue fiction.65  The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the purpose of closing
argument in United States v. Bailey.6 In Bailey, the court stated that "'[t]he
sole purpose of closing argument is to assist the jury in analyzing the
evidence."' 67  The court pointed out that "[w]hile a prosecutor may not
exceed the evidence in closing argument, he may state conclusions drawn
from the evidence." 68  The court continued and said that "[a]lthough a
prosecutor may not make an argument directed to passions or prejudices of
the jurors instead of an understanding of the facts and law, there is no
prohibition on 'colorful and perhaps flamboyant' remarks if they relate to the
evidence adduced at trial."69
60. Id. at 385.
61. Holton v. State, 573 So. 2d 284,288 n.3 (Fla. 1990).
62. Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336, 1340-41 (Fla. 1990).
63. Holton, 573 So. 2d at 288.
64. Willis v. State, 669 So. 2d 1090, 1094 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
65. Dunsizer v. State, No. 97-03068, 1999 WL 94970, at *2 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. Feb.
26, 1999) (Casanueva, J., concurring).
66. 123 F.3d 1381 (llthCir. 1997).
67. Id. at 1400 (quoting United States v. Iglesias, 915 F.2d 1524,1529 (1lth Cir. 1990)).
68. Id. (internal citations omitted).
69. Id. (internal citations omitted).
1999]
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In Bertolotti v. State," the Supreme Court of Florida described thepurpose of the closing argument:
The proper exercise of closing argument is to review the evidence
and to explicate those inferences which may reasonably be drawn
from the evidence. Conversely, it must not be used to inflame the
minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an
emotional response to the crime or the defendant rather than the
logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.
71
A. Civil Cases
1. Expressing Personal Opinion vs. Confining Argument
to the Evidence Presented
In Simmons v. Swinton,72 the passenger and driver of a rear-ended motor
vehicle sued the driver of the other vehicle.73 The trial court granted a new
trial based on improper statements by the defense counsel during closing
argument, that the trial court concluded constituted fundamental error.
During closing argument, the defense attorney argued the plaintiff's treatinx
physician had an ulterior motive in blaming her injuries on the accident.
The defendant's attorney argued the plaintiff's injuries were actually caused
by falls resulting from medication prescribed by the treating physician.76 On
appeal, plaintiff's counsel argued the comments were egregious but
"admitted that he did not object to the closing in order to preserve the error
for appellate review.
' 77
The Fifth District Court of Appeal held that defense counsel's
arguments were proper because "the attorney confined closing argument to
the evidence presented and reasonable inferences that could be drawn from
70. 476 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1985).
71. Id. at 134. See Robinson v. State, 610 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); Mann v. State, 603
So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1992); Jackson v. State, 522 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1988); Cochran v. State, 711 So.
2d 1159 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Williams v. State, 689 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1997); Hightower v. State, 592 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (Gersten, J., dissenting);
Rosso v. State, 505 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
72. 715 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied 727 So. 2d 911 (Fla.
1999).
73. Id. at 371.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 373.
76. Id.
77. Simmons, 715 So. 2d at 373.
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the evidence."78 The appellate court noted that opposing counsel should
make an objection at the time the offensive comment is made to "allow the
trial court to correct the offending counsel's behavior."79 The Fifth District
reversed and instructed the trial court to reinstate the verdict.80
2. Community Conscience Arguments
In Kiwanis Club of Little Havana, Inc. v. Kalafe," Kalafe, a Brazilian-
born singer and composer, sued Kiwanis Club and its representative for
tortious interference with a contract and defamation.82  The trial court
83
entered a final judgment in favor of Kalafe, and Kiwanis Club appealed.
During closing argument, Kalafe's counsel stated "[w]hat if in the past
somebody was a Democrat or Brazilian, where do you draw the line? Use
reason. Look at the evidence and realize this type of politics is uncalled for
and shouldn't be used." 4 Kalafe's counsel also argued that "Eighth Street
belongs to all of us. It is not their home and your verdict should reflect how
you feel about this conduct.,8 5 Kalafe's counsel further argued that "people
of Cuba[] ... haven't been too lucky with politics .... The last thing in the
world is that we should bring the type of politics here that causes the
problems to begin with .... ,86
The Third District Court of Appeal addressed the impropriety of
Kalafe's counsel's remarks and stated "Florida courts have consistently
rejected arguments that are nothing more than 'impassioned and prejudicial
pleas intended to evoke a sense of community law through common duty and
expectation.', 8 7 The Third District characterized the comments as an imper-
missible reference to community conscience and noted the comments in the
case "stray[ed] dangerously close to constituting reversible error.' 88 The
judgment was reversed on other grounds.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 373-74.
80. Id. at 374.
81. 723 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 3d Dist. C App. 1998).
82. Id. at 840.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 842 n.5.
85. Id.
86. Kiwanis Club, 723 So. 2d at 842 n.5.
87. Id. at 842 (quoting Norman v. Gloria Farms, Inc., 668 So. 2d 1016, 1021 (Fla. 4th
Dist. C App. 1996)).
88. Id.
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3. Expressing Personal Opinion and Bolstering Credibility
Davis v. South Florida Water Management District9 was a
condemnation proceeding that involved a large tract of land in Palm Beach
County taken for Everglades restoration purposes. 90 The landowner present-
ed expert testimony that the fair market value of the land was eighteen
million dollars.91 The water district ex1pert testified that the fair market value
of the land was ten million dollars. The landowner appealed the final
judgment of the trial court and asserted that the water district's counsel
placed "his own credibility into the argument, offered his personal opinion to
the jury, and suggested that the jurors would ultimately pay for the verdict as
taxpayers. 93 During closing argument, the landowner's counsel argued the
"full bucket" compensation theory:
Full compensation is your goal, as the constitution requires. It's
kind of like a bucket of water. A bucket of water you fill to the
brim, and you know if it spills over and you know when it's less.
And what we want here is for the bucket to be full. And by full I
simply mean, please find from the evidence, not from the
hypothetical argumentation, but from actual sales in the
marketplace, what this property would bring to these owners if it
weren't taken as of February 7, 1996.94
The water district's counsel then argued:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it's easy to make an appeal that
the property owner ought to receive a full bucket. And as a lawyer
and an officer of the court, and an attorney who is proud to
represent South Florida Water Management District and other
condemning authorities and private property owners, I will tell you
that $18 million overflows that bucket by $8 million because
they're asking you to pay, they're asking you to consider the value
of this property with elements of risk, and elements that aren't there
and may never be there.
95
89. 715 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
90. Id. at 997.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 998.
94. Davis, 715 So. 2d at 998.
95. Id.
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Davis' counsel objected and moved for a mistrial arguing the comment
"suggested that the jurors would pay an inflated amount in their role as
taxpayers. '96 The trial court reserved the ruling and allowed the district's
counsel to remedy that suggestion.9 The water district's counsel then stated:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it's very clear that none of you
have to pay anything, and when I said you, I meant you in the role
of a willing buyer would have to pay. I understand that none of
you are the buyers. This hypothetical buyer would have to pay that
amount of money, and that would overflow, that would reduce the
compensation using Mr. Brigham's analogy, more than overflow
the barrel, the bucket, by almost $8 million or $9 million.98
The Fourth District Court of Appeal said it would be patently improper
to suggest a jury consider that the jury award would come out of their
pockets as taxpayers. 99 However, the Fourth District continued and said that
"[a]lthough the 'asking you to pay' comment could be construed as
reminding the jurors that they are taxpayers, here it does not rise to the level
of reversible error."'1  The district court found the statement was in
response to Davis' prior "characterization that the jurors had to fill the
'bucket' of full compensation" and was not prejudicial considering the
clarification.01 The Fourth District noted that using the phrase "award"
would have been more prudent than using the phrase "to pay.'' °
Although the Fourth District affirmed the judgment, it recognized that
the water district's counsel's statement that as an "officer of the court" and
an attorney for a state agency was an improper attempt to bolster his own
credibility. 03 The court found those statements "particularly offensive."' 4
However, the Fourth District affirmed because opposing counsel had failed
to object at trial and the remarks did not constitute fundamental error.105
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Davis, 715 So. 2d at 999.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Davis, 715 So. 2d at 999.
105. Id.
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4. Violating an Order in Limine
In Leyva v. Samess,'°6 Mr. Leyva sustained personal injuries when he
was involved in a collision with a vehicle operated by Daniel Samess and
owned by his parents, Dr. Ronald Samess and Mrs. Claudette SamessY°7 The
trial court granted defense counsel's motion in limine in part and prohibited
Leyva's counsel from referencing during closing argument that the owner of
the vehicle was a doctor.108 However, the trial court allowed the use of the
"doctor" reference during voir dire so that Leyva's counsel could determine
if any of the jurors had been treated by Dr. Samess.1 9
During closing argument, Leyva's counsel said "I would like to explain
to you, Dr. and Mrs. Samess are a party to this lawsuit... owners of a
vehicle are responsible for any negligence on the part of their driver if the
driver is driving their car with their knowledge and consent."110 Plaintiff's
counsel then stated "the Defendants have admitted that Dr. and Mrs. Samess
own the vehicle." ''1 Defense counsel objected to the violation of the motion
in limine, and the trial court sustained the objection.1 12 The defense moved
for a new trial, and the trial court reserved ruling on the motion for new
trial.' The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for $119,400,
reduced by the twenty percent for comparative negligence. 1
14
The trial court then granted the motion for new trial having determined
that "one party's 'egregious' violation of an order in limine entitled the other
party to a new trial."1  The trial court found that plaintiff's counsel "had
violated the [pretrial] order by referring to Ronald Samess as a doctor."'
1 6
The trial court incorrectly determined "where an order granting a pretrial
motion in limine has been established, a subsequent egregious violation of
that order by one party entitles the other party to a new trial."
17
The Fourth District Court of Appeal found the trial court abused its
discretion when it granted the new trial because it used an incorrect standard
of review when it reviewed the comments made in closing argument.1 8 The
106. 732 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
107. Id. at 1119.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1119-20.
111. Leyva, 732 So. 2d at 1120.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Leyva, 732 So. 2d at 1120.
117. Id. at 1121.
118. Id. at 1121-22.
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Fourth District Court of Appeal stated that "[n]ot every violation of a pretrial
order in limine should automatically result in a new trial." 9 The Fourth
District followed the "principle that in order to grant a new trial for improper
comments in closing argument, the trial court must find that the argument
was 'highly prejudicial and inflammatory." ' 12 Durin voir dire, the jury had
already learned that Ronald Samess was a doctor." Although plaintiff's
comments violated the pretrial order, the Fourth District found that the brief
references to the fact that the owner of the defendant vehicle was a doctor
was not so "highly prejudicial or inflammatory" as to require a new trial.122
5. Invoking Sympathy to Inflate the Recovery of Damages
In Knoizen v. Bruegger,'2 Ms. Bruegger suffered severe and debilitat-
ing injuries when her motorcycle collided head-on with an automobile. 124
Ms. Bruegger's injuries included five major pelvic fractures, vaginal
lacerations, a broken femur, and an open wrist fracture. Additionally, she
lost physical support for her bladder and suffered a prolapsed bladder and
uterus.
During closing argument, Ms. Bruegger's attorney argued that the
injuries were the "most devastating injury a woman can suffer' 26 and the
injuries were devastating to her family and children. 127 He argued that the
jury should not leave Ms. Bruegger alone to deal with the injuries she
suffered. 28 Bruegger's attorney said "[d]on't leave her bare and naked, like
this accident has already left her, and her children and her family. Don't
leave hdr like that." Knozien's counsel objected and argued that the
remarks were improper attempts to invoke jury sympathy and an attempt to
inflame the passions of the jury.3 0 The trial court overruled Knozien's
objection.13'
119. Id. at 1121.
120. Id. (quoting Grushoff v. Denny's, Inc., 693 So. 2d 1068, 1069 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. (1997)).
121. Leyva,732So.2dat 1122.
122. Id
123. 713 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
124. Id. at 1071.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1072.
127. Id.
128. Knoizen, 713 So. 2d at 1072.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
Tobin
17
Tobin: Criminal Law
Published by NSUWorks, 1999
Nova Law Review
The Fifth District Court of Appeal found that testimony that the
accident had a devastating effect upon Ms. Bruegger and her family
supported the closing argument.132 The court found the closing argument
was only "marginally objectionable."'' 33 The court noted that "[a]ttorneys
are given broad latitude during closing, but they must confine their argument
to the facts and evidence presented to the jury and all logical deductions
from the facts and evidence."' 34 The Fifth District also found that the
appellant failed to establish the argument was so "'pervasive, inflammatory,
and prejudicial to preclude the jury's rational consideration of the case.' ' 135
6. The Fourth District Court of Appeal Explains the Requirement for a
Contemporaneous Objection
In Murphy v. International Robotics Systems, Inc.,131 Judge Klein
explained why the Fourth District Court of Appeal did not agree with other
district courts when they reverse cases because of improper, but unobjected-
to, closing argument of counsel. 137 The court stated that its explanation was
made "in the hopes that a litigant considering an appeal to this court, whose
best hope for reversal is unobjected-to argument of counsel, will carefully
consider whether it is worth the cost.
138
In Murphy, defense counsel accused one of the plaintiffs "of wanting to
cash in a lottery ticket in this litigation and suggest[ed] that if the jurors
awarded appellant damages based on a phony consultancy agreement they
would be accessories, after the fact, to tax fraud."' 39 At oral argument, the
court asked why plaintiffs' counsel did not object. 4° Plaintiffs' counsel
responded that it was "his practice not to object because the jury might hold
it against his client."'
4
'
The court stated "improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument in a
civil case is [not] something which is so fundamental that there should be an
132. Id.
133. Knoizen, 713 So. 2d at 1072.
134. Id.
135. Id. (quoting Hagan v. Sun Bank of Mid-Fla., N.A., 666 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1996)).
136. 710 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review granted, 722 So. 2d 193 (Fla.
1998).
137. Id. at 587 n.1.
138. Id. at 588.
139. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
140. Id.
141. Murphy, 710 So. 2d at 588.
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exception to the rule requiring an objection." 142 The Fourth District relied
upon the Supreme Court of Florida's explanation in Castor v. State:
The requirement of a contemporaneous objection is based on
practical necessity and basic fairness in the operation of a judicial
system. It places the trial judge on notice that error may have been
committed, and provides him an opportunity to correct it at early
state of the proceedings. Delay and an unnecessary use of the
appellate process result from a failure to cure early that which must
be cured eventually.
143
The Fourth District Court of Appeal pointed out that the contempor-
aneous objection rule requires that an objection be made at the time of the
remarks.144 "If the [trial] court sustains the objection, there must be a motion
for mistrial in order to preserve the issue on appeal." 45 However, "the
motion for mistrial can be made later, at the close of argument in order to
give counsel time to think about whether to seek a mistrial."' 4  The court
noted that the last time the Supreme Court of Florida reversed for a new trial
based on unobjected-to closing argument was in 1956.'47 Further, the court
noted that the last time the Supreme Court of Florida considered the issue in
a civil case was in 1961. 48
The Fourth District then stated, "[tihere is an exception to the
contemporaneous objection rule, for errors which are deemed fundamental
and which can thus be raised for the first time on appeal."1 49 The Supreme
Court of Florida has defined fundamental error as "'error which goes to the
foundation of the case, or goes to the merits of the cause of action,' which
appellate courts should apply 'very guardedly.
'
"
150
The Fourth District stated that its refusal to allow improper, unobjected-
to closing argument of counsel to be raised for the first time on appeal was
consistent with the supreme court.151 The court noted that improper
argument is a nationwide problem: "no other courts in this country allow
improper argument to be raised for the first time on appeal in civil cases,"152
142. Id. at 589.
143. Id. (quoting Castor v. State, 365 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1978)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Murphy, 710 So. 2d at 589.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 590.
150. Id. (quoting Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134, 137 (Fla. 1970)).
151. Murphy, 710 So. 2d at 591.
152. Id.
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and "few courts have even addressed the issue of whether it could be raised
for the first time on appeal." 153 Following the Fourth District's opinion, the
Fifth District Court of Appeal and the Third District Court of Appeal have
followed the contemporaneous objection rule.1 54
B. Criminal Cases
1. Foul Blows vs. Hard Blows
In Berger v. United States, 55 Justice Sutherland delivered an opinion
condemning improper argument:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at
all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is
in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it
is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. 56
153. Id.
154. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gutierrez, 731 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(citing Gaines v. Amerisure, Ins. Co., 701 So. 2d 1192, 1193 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997))
(stating that "a review of the record shows that defense counsel failed to object to the majority of
the allegedly improper comments, thereby not preserving them for appellate review"); Fravel v.
Haughey, 727 So. 2d 1033, 1037 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (noting "[t]his ruling will remand
[sic] lawyers to raise timely objections when confronted with improper argument and create
predictability with regard to the future disposition of similar cases by this court"); Kelly v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 720 So. 2d 1145, 1147 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that although
some comments made during State Farm's closing argument "were indeed improper, no
contemporaneous objections were made, and we do not find the comments as a whole constitute
fundamental error").
155. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
156. Id. at 88; see also Gore v. State, 719 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. 1998); Craig v. State,
685 So. 2d 1224, 1229 (Fla. 1996); Miller v. State, 712 So. 2d 451, 453 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1998); Cochran v. State, 711 So. 2d 1159, 1163 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); DeFreitas v. State,
701 So. 2d 593, 606 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Hampton v. State, 680 So. 2d 581, 585 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Lozano, 616 So. 2d 73, 76 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Rosso
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2. Community Conscience Arguments
In Del Rio v. State,157 the jury found the defendant guilty of first degree
murder, attempted second degree murder with a firearm, attempted first
degree murder with a firearm, and burglary of an occupied dwelling with an
assault and with a firearm. 15  The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed
Del Rio's conviction and sentence because the trial court provided curative
instructions, and overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt was
presented at trial.159 However, the court wrote its opinion specifically to
address the prosecutor's improper comments during closing argument.'6
During closing argument, the prosecutor referred to the city as a place
where "death is cheap."'16 He also commented on the jurors' personal stake
in the matter when he said "[t]he law protects all of us or the law protects
none of us.' 62 The prosecutor further stated that "[i]n the south, we saw it
when it happened to blacks. In Germany we saw it when it happened to the
Jews.' 63 The Third District repeated that "counsel should avoid impassion-
ed and prejudicial arguments which impermissibly appeal to the jury's
'community conscience' or sense of 'civic responsibility."' 164 The court
strongly disapproved of the yrosecutor's conduct in the case and sent the
opinion to The Florida 
Bar..i
3. Leading the Jury to Believe the Defendant Has the
Burden of Proving His Innocence
In Thomas v. State,166 the jury found the defendant guilty of tampering
with evidence. 167 The defendant was a passenger in an automobile driven by
v. State, 505 So. 2d 611, 614 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Clausell v. State, 455 So. 2d 1050,
1054 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984), panel decision approved, en banc decision quashed, 474 So.
2d 1189 (Fla. 1985); Boatwright v. State, 452 So. 2d 666, 667-68 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
Harden v. State, 303 So. 2d 679, 680 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1974); Rolle v. State, 268 So. 2d
541, 542 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1972); Marsh v. State, 202 So. 2d 222, 224 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1967).
157. 732 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1999).
158. Id. at 1100.
159. Id. at 1102.
160. Id. at 1101.
161. Id.
162. Del Rio, 732 So. 2d at 1101.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1102 n.1.
166. 726 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999).
167. Id. at 369.
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his girlfriend. 168 The police stopped the car in the middle of the road with its
lights off and engine running.169" The only defense witness at trial was the
defendant's girlfriend. 17 She testified at trial that she and Thomas were in
the area to take a busboy with whom she worked home.
171
The defendant's appeal centered upon the prosecutor's remark during
the rebuttal portion of her closing argument when she said "[t]hey told you
that she had gone there into this unknown neighborhood to drop off a
busboy. Where is this busboy today? I don't know."'172 Defense counsel
objected and moved for a mistrial. 3 The trial court immediately gave a
curative instruction and later denied the motion for mistrial.' 74
Commenting on the defendant's failure to call a witness may be cause
for reversal because such comments may lead a jury to believe the defendant
has the burden of proving his innocence. 175 Although the Fourth District
Court of Appeal has frequently taken a strong position against such
comments, there are exceptions to the rule. 176 However, these exceptions are
limited to circumstances in which defense counsel "opens the door" and
thus, allows the prosecutor to comment in rebuttal.'7 The Supreme Court of
Florida has stated:
[TI]his Court has applied a narrow exception to allow comment
when the defendant voluntarily assumes some burden of proof by
asserting the defenses of alibi, self-defense, and defense of others,
relying on facts that could be elicited only from a witness who is
not equally available to the state. A witness is not equally available
when there is a special relationship between the defendant and the
witness.
178
The Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded the phantom busboy in
Thomas did not have a special relationship with the defendant. 179 Further,
the court concluded that "[a]lthough the defense raised the subject of the
busboy and placed in issue its explanation for the otherwise suspicious
168. Id. at 369.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 370.
171. Thomas, 726 So. 2d at 370.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Thomas, 726 So. 2d at 370.
177. Id.
178. Ial at 371 (quoting Jackson v. State, 575 So. 2d 181, 188 (Fla. 1991)).
179. Id. at 371.
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circumstances leading up to the incident," the prosecutor's comment was
impermissible. °80 However, the court held that because the trial court
immediately gave a curative instruction, the prosecutor's impermissible
comment did not warrant reversal.' 8 '
4. Personal Attacks on the Defendant
In Copertino v. State, the defendant was convicted of five counts of
manslaughter by culpable negligence and six counts of culpable
negligence.1 83 He appealed on numerous grounds, including prosecutorial
misconduct. 84 During closing ar.ment, the prosecutor characterized the
defendant as "young Mr. Hitler." The court addressed the prosecutor's
remark and stated:
We understand the human tendency to identify with the victims of
such senseless conduct and their families, as in this case where so
many young people died. Prosecutors must nevertheless steel
themselves against such emotions and direct their energies to
presenting the state's case within the law. They are not given the
right to voice the same emotions understandably expressed by the
families of the victims.
186
The court then noted that the prosecutor's trial conduct suggested a
personal interest in winning, rather than detached advocacy for the State.'
87
Although the Fourth District Court of Appeal found the remark was
improper, it held that "[t]he state's evidehce in this case is so compelling that
the jury returned the only verdict possible."' 88189
In Gore v. State, the defendant had been found guilty of first degree
murder and armed robbery and was sentenced to death by the trial court after
a unanimous jury recommendation. 9° During closing argument of the guilt
phase, the prosecutor referred to the defendant and said:
180. Id. at371-72.
181. Thomas, 726 So. 2d at 372.
182. 726 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999), review denied, 735 So. 2d 1284 (Fla.
1999).
183. Id. at 332.
184. Id.
185. Id. at334.
186. Id.
187. Coppertino, 726 So. 2d at 334 n.2.
188. Id. at 334.
189. 719 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1998).
190. Id. at 1198.
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You know, Ladies and Gentlemen, there's a lot of rules and
procedures that I have to follow in court, and there's a lot of things
I can say or can't say, but there's one thing the Judge can't ever
make me say and that is he can never make me say that's a human
being.1
91
The Supreme Court of Florida stated that "engag[ing] in vituperative or
pejorative characterizations of a defendant or witness" is clearly improper
for the prosecutor.1 92 Because of the collective effect of the prosecutor's
improper questioning of the defendant during cross-examination and the
improper closing argument the supreme court reversed the case and
remanded it for a new trial. 19 The supreme court noted that the prosecutor's
'over zealousness in prosecuting the State's cause worked against justice,
rather than for it."'
1 94
5. Commenting on Defendant's Right to Remain Silent
In State v. Hoggins,195 the defendant was convicted of attempted first
degree murder with a firearm, armed robbery, aggravated assault with a fire-
arm, and resisting arrest without violence.1 9 The defendant based his appeal
in part on the prosecutor's remarks during closing argument. 197 During
closing argument, the prosecutor argued the defendant did not tell his
version of events to the police on the night he was arrested:
Now, when Mr. Hoggins gives his story-When you remember
the story that he gave the other day, remember one thing, that the
police arrived at that apartment to conduct a search. It was then
that they found him hiding in the upstairs bedroom in the apartment
of his girlfriend. Remember, he doesn't tell them that story at that
time.
Now, when they bring him downstairs and have him confronted
face to face with the victim, who is so outraged.... saying "You
tried to kill me," and that victim when confronted with him tries to
191. Id. at 1201.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1202-03.
194. Gore, 719 So. 2d at 1203 (quoting Ryan v. State, 457 So. 2d 1084, 1091 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
195. 718 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1998).
196. Id. at 764.
197. Id. at 762.
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go after this man, he never mentioned his story. [Objection
overruled].
Mr. Hoggins did not give them that story. Ronnie Hoggins,
never did at that point say anything like, "Man, I didn't try to shoot
you. I didn't rob your store. I just found that money and stuff and
picked it all up and ran into the apartment."
198
During rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized that the
defendant had failed to come forward with an exculpatory explanation prior
to trial:
Not once does this Defendant give the police the count [sic] that he
came up with when he took the witness stand today. He gave this
statement under oath, but never anytime previous to today did he
ever say this story to the police about how he came across this
money and stuff.... Having been advised of his constitutional
right he never mentioned one time this story he has said here
today.
199
No objection was made to the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument.200 On
appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and held that the
prosecutor improperly commented on the defendant's custodial, pre-Miranda
silence and violated the due process guarantees of article I, section 9 of the
Florida Constitution. 201  The Fourth District recognized a conflict and
certified a question to the Supreme Court of Florida.202 The Supreme Court
of Florida rephrased the question:
DOES FLORIDA CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 9,
PREVENT THE IMPEACHMENT OF A TESTIFYING
DEFENDANT WITH THE DEFENDANT'S SILENCE
MAINTAINED AT THE TIME OF ARREST BUT PRIOR TO
THE RECEIPT OF MIRANDA WARNINGS?
203
The Supreme Court of Florida answered the question in the affin-mative
and explained how Florida courts differ from the United States Supreme
Court on the right to remain silent:
198. Id. at 764.
199. Id.
200. Hoggins, 718 So. 2d at 764 n.3.
201. Id at 764.
202. Id.
203. Id at 762 (emphasis in original).
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Florida courts reach a different conclusion than does the United
States Supreme Court on the issue of postarrest, pre-Miranda
silence for two reasons. First, unlike the United States Supreme
Court, Florida courts have recognized that the defendant does not
waive his or her right to silence at the time of arrest by taking the
stand in his or her own defense. Regardless of whether evidence of
post arrest silence is introduced in the state's case-in-chief or for
impeachment purposes, the same test applies. If the comment is
fairly susceptible of being construed by the jury as a comment on
the defendant's exercise of his or her right to remain silent, it
violates the defendant's right to silence.
2 4
The Supreme Court of Florida held "[t]he comments at issue... were
fairly susceptible of being interpreted as comments on Hoggins' silence and
therefore clearly violated his right to remain silent." 5
6. Personal Attacks on Defense Counsel
Florida courts do not condone personal attacks on defense counsel
because they are an improper trial tactic that can poison the minds of the
jury.220
In Del Rio v. State,m the defendant was convicted of first degree
murder with a firearm, attempted second degree murder with a firearm,
attempted first degree murder with a firearm and burglary of an occupied
dwelling with an assault and with a firearm.2°8 The Third District Court of
Appeal affirmed the convictions and sentence but wrote an opinion
specifically to address the improper comments made by the prosecutor.
2W
204. kIL at 769.
205. Hoggins, 718 So. 2d at 769.
206. See Cochran v. State, 711 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Landry v.
State, 620 So. 2d 1099, 1102 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Ryan v. State, 457 So. 2d 1084,
1089 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Briggs v. State, 455 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1984); McGee v. State, 435 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Westley v. State, 416 So.
2d 18 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Melton v. State, 402 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1981); Hufham v. State, 400 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Simpson v. State, 352 So.
2d 125 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1977); Thompson v. State, 318 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App.
1975); Cochran v. State, 280 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
207. 732 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
208. Id.at 1101.
209. Id. (the prosecutor denigrated the city as a place where "death is cheap" and
commented upon his own and the jurors' personal stake in the case when he said "thie law
protects all of us or the law protects none of us and how [i]n the south, we saw it when it
happened to blacks. In Germany we saw it when it happened to the Jews.").
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During closing argument, the prosecutor attacked the integrity of defense
counsel when he referred to defense counsel and said "[s]ee this man here
who claims to be a lawyer in good standing in Miami, Florida and that is the
same guy who is going to get up when I sit down and try to tell you what the
evidence showed."21 The Third District Court of Appeal stated that it "will
not condone inflammatory and prejudicial remarks attacking the integrity of
opposing counsel. 21' The Third District cautioned the prosecution about
improper comments and sent a copy of its opinion to The Florida Bar for
investigation.212
In Barnes v. State,213 defense counsel argued there was a lack of
214
objective evidence linking the defendant to the crime. Defense counsel
told the jury a guilty verdict would have to rest on eyewitness identification
and the testimony of the defendant's former defense counsel hadand he estiony215
compromised the identification. In response, the prosecutor characterized
the former defense counsel's testimony as "the mercenary actions of... a
hired gun, hired by the-. 216 Defense counsel objected and requested the
prosecutor's remark be stricken.217 The trial judge instructed the jury to
ignore that last comment.218 Ignoring the judge, the prosecutor immediately
continued his argument and said "-who was hired to go over there and
defend this guy.,,219 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and held
that the prosecutor's argument was highly improper and affected the jury's
deliberations "in spite of a sustained objection and the curative
instruction.
''
=
The Fourth District was troubled by the way the trial judge granted the
motion to strike and was concerned about the insufficiency of the curative
instruction. 221 The court said the trial judge's statement, "[i]gnore the last
210. Id. at 1102.
211. Id. See also Owens Coming Fiberglass Corp. v. Morse, 653 So. 2d 409, 410 (Fa.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (referring to opposing counsel as "a master of trickery"); Sun
Supermarkets, Inc. v. Fields, 568 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (commenting that
opposing counsel lied and committed a fraud upon the court and jury); Jackson v. State, 421 So.
2d 15, 16 n.1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (referring to opposing counsel as a "cheap shot
artist").
212. Del Rio, 732 So. 2d at 1102 n.1.
213. 743 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999).
214. Id. at 1106.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Barnes, 743 So. 2d at 1106.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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comment" was ambiguous and vaporous. 22 The court stated "[w]hen a
judge grants a motion to strike . . it is important that the fact of granting the
motion be made unmistakably clear to the jury." 3 The court continued by
adding that it is "very important that the precise comment to be stricken be
identified in a way that will leave no room for doubt about what the jury
must ignore." 224 The court explained the proper method for handling this
type of objection:
When it is made to appear that a prosecuting officer has
overstepped the bounds of that propriety and fairness which should
characterize the conduct of a state's counsel in the prosecution of a
criminal case, or where a prosecuting attorney's argument to the
jury is undignified and intemperate, and contains aspersions,
improper insinuations, and assertions of matters not in evidence, or
consists of an appeal to prejudice or sympathy calculated to unduly
influence a trial jury, the trial judge should not only sustain an
objection at the time to such improper conduct when objection is
offered, but should so affirmatively rebuke the offending prosecut-
ing officer as to impress upon the jury the gross impropriety of
being influenced by improper arguments.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal then directed its attention to
attorney professionalism.226 The court observed that the prosecutor's prior
misconduct required a new trial in four other cases.2 7  Because the
prosecutor had persisted in improper conduct, the court called for sanctions
when it referred the matter to The Florida Bar and stated: "[w]ith the fourth
rebuke of prosecutor Milian by this court, we hope that the disciplinary
organs of The Florida Bar will finally bring their compelling powers to bear
on this lawyer who either refuses or is unable to limit his trial tactics to that
which are ethical and proper. ' 2
28
222. Id. at 1107.
223. Barnes, 743 So. 2d at 1107.
224. Id.
225. Id. (quoting Deas v. State, 161 So. 729, 731 (Fla. 1935)) (emphasis in original).
226. Id. at 1108.
227. Id.; See Cochran v. State, 711 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Knight v.
State, 672 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Klepak v. State, 622 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Landry v. State, 620 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
228. Barnes, 743 So. 2d at 1109.
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7. Disclosing the Length of the Sentence
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.390(a) provides that "[t]he
presiding judge shall charge the jury only on the law of the case at the
conclusion of argument of counsel. Except in capital cases, the judge shall
not instruct the jury on the sentence that may be imposed for the offense for
which the accused is on trial."2 9  The Supreme Court of Florida has
construed this rule literally: "[T]he jury need only be instructed as to the
possible penalty when it is faced with the choice of recommending either the
death penalty or life imprisonment. As to offenses in which the jury plays
no role in sentencing, the jury will not be advised of the possible
penalties."230 Thus, neither the defense nor the prosecutor is permitted to
disclose the length of the sentence for the crime charged or for any lesser
included offenses.
In Legette v. State,231 the defendant was charged with second degree
murder, and the jury found him guilty of manslaughter. The trial court
informed counsel it would instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of
manslaughter, battery, and improper exhibition of a weapon.2 33 During closing
argument, the prosecutor told the jury that battery was a misdemeanor.2 3 4 The
defense objected and moved for a mistrial, which was overruled by the trial
court. 23 5
The court stated that allowing a prosecutor to "inject the length of
sentence into closing argument [was] contrary to the policy behind the 1984
amendment to rule 3.390(a), that the jury should decide a case in accordance
with the law and the evidence and disregard the consequences of its verdict." 36
However, the court found that the reference to the misdemeanor was not
prejudicial pursuant to section 924.051(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes.37
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction but wrote an
opinion discussing the prosecutor's closing argument.23' The Fourth District
said "[t]he reference to a misdemeanor suggested to the jury that the sentence
for battery was relatively minor when compared to second degree murder and
229. FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.390(a).
230. Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336, 1345 (Fla. 1990).
231. 718 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
232. Id. at 878.
233. Id. at 880.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Legette, 718 So. 2d at 881.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 878-79.
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manslaughter." 39 The court discussed the reasons for the 1985 amendment to
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.390(a). 240 Before 1985, the jury was
allowed to consider the issue of sentence length.241 The Fourth District found
two reasons for the amendment: "to 'minimize the potential for jury sympathy
based on the defendant's possible sentence' [and] to harness the jury's exercise
of its pardon power.,
242
8. Bolstering the Credibility of Police Officers
In Freeman v. State,243 the defendant was convicted of carrying a
concealed firearm and sentenced to two years of probation.244 At trial, the
testimony of the State's witnesses was in direct conflict with the defense
witnesses' testimony concerning whether the firearm discovered in the
defendant's automobile was concealed from the police officers.245 Duringclosing argument, the prosecutor stated:
... So that's the question. Who do you want to believe here? Do
you want to believe the officers or do you want to believe Mr.
Freeman?
Ladies and gentlemen, I'm here to tell you that you should believe
the officers. Why should you believe the officers? Simply because
they're police officers, because they're sworn to uphold the law,
because they're trained observers, because they have no reason to
lie."'6
The court reasoned that because the credibility of the State's witnesses
was crucial in determining the factual dispute about concealment of the
weapon, the prosecutor's argument was clearly improper and was not247
harmless error. The prosecutor later referred to facts not in evidence andthe defense objected. Although the defense had made no objection to the
239. Id. at 880.
240. Id.
241. Legette, 718 So. 2d at 880.
242. Id. (quoting Limose v. State, 656 So. 2d 947, 949 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
243. 717 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
244. Id. at 105.
245. Id. at 106.
246. Id. at 105.
247. Id. at 105-06.
248. Freeman, 717 So. 2d at 106.
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first offending argument,249 the court found the prosecutor's collective
comments were "so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial."' 0
In Sinclair v. State,2 51 the defendant was convicted of attempted first-
degree murder, robbery, and armed burglary. 2  Although the Fourth District
Court of Appeal affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence, it wrote
an opinion to admonish the prosecutor's improper comment on the veracity
of a detective who testified . The prosecutor stated, "Detective Shotwell,
you have to determine if he is the kind of detective you want to believe or
not. Do you [sic] want to put his career on the line and for whatever
motivations as lead-."' 54 The defense objected and the trial court gave a
curative instruction.25 The Fourth District stated that it has "repeatedly
condemned comments that the jury should believe a police officer because
the officer would not put his or her career on the line by committing
perjury." 6 The court then explained why this type of argument is patently
improper:
First, although such comments may not in some instances constitute
an affirmative statement of the prosecutor's personal belief in the
veracity of the police officer, they do constitute an inappropriate
attempt to persuade the jury that the police officer's testimony
should be believed simply because the witness is a police officer.
Second, such comments make reference to matters outside the
record and constituted [sic] impermissible bolstering of the police
officer's testimony. 7
The Fourth District concluded that because the trial court sustained the
objection and gave a curative instruction, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied the motion for mistrial based upon the improper
comment.5 8
249. Id. at 105.
250. Id. at 106.
251. 717 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
252. Id. at 100.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Sinclair, 77 So. 2d at 100.
257. I& (quoting Cisneros v. State, 678 So. 2d 888, 890 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
258. Id. at 101.
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9. Bolstering the Credibility of the Victim
In Lewis v. State,259 the defendant was found guilty of armed robbery
with a weapon and armed car jacking with a weapon and was sentenced to
fifteen years in state prison.26 He appealed his conviction and sentence and
argued "that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for mistrial based on
improper arguments made by the prosecutor during closing argument." 261
Although the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and
sentence, it noted that the prosecutor's closing argument was extremely
disturbing.262 During closing argument, the prosecutor improperly and
repeatedly vouched for and bolstered the testimony of the victim:
And, he was honest. He didn't exaggerate. He didn't ie. He
didn't go in and say, "[y]eah, that's the guy," because, you know
he's a nice kid. That's just the type of person he is. As a matter
of fact, even when he was describing the gun, he said, "look, it was
used in a manner that I believed it was a gun." But he's not going
to come out and say, yeah, man, a hundred percent it's a gun,
because that's the type of person he is.
Don't let that confuse you. Don't release him into society. Don't
let him walk simply because [the victim] is super honest or
super accurate.
Don't reward him because Peter [the victim] is a super honest
guy and would not come in here and exaggerate and would not
come in here and lie.
263
The court said vouching for the credibility of the victim was improper, but
the error was harmless considering the overwhelming evidence of guilt.264
259. 711 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, 725 So. 2d 1109 (Fla.
1998).
260. Lewis, 711 So. 2d at 206-07. See also Deluca v. State, 736 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
261. Id. at 207.
262. Id.
263. Id. (emphasis in original).
264. Id. at 208.
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10. Ridiculing the Defense Theory
In Miller v. State,265 the defendant was convicted of burglary of a
dwelling, petit theft, and attempted burglary.2 s He appealed and claimed
inter alia that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a new trial
based on improper arguments the prosecutor made during closing
argument.26 7 During trial, the defendant asserted the defense of voluntary
intoxication.268 The State and the defense presented witness testimony that
supported the voluntary intoxication defense.269 During closing argument,
the prosecutor stated:
PROSECUTOR: Voluntary intoxication. Let's talk about this.
Their defense is the defense of lack of responsibility. That's
simply what it is. He has the nerve to tell you he drank twenty-one
beers. No one tied him down, no one forced him to do it-
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I object, this is an instruction
on the law.
THE COURT: Overruled. This is argument.
PROSECUTOR: No one forced him to drink those twenty-one
beers he claims to have drunk that night, but still is able to at least
walk. But yet, because he chose to drink in a reckless manner he's
not guilty. Where's the responsibility for your actions?
This is not a case about lack of intent, it's a question of lack of
responsibility. For when he tells you that he was voluntarily
intoxicated, "I'm so drunk I don't know what I'm doing, I don't
know what is right from wrong," who did the drinking? And who
forced him to drink?7 °
The Fourth District said the prosecutor's comments improperly
expressed personal opinion of the defense theory.27' The court stated a
defendant has a "fundamental right to present a defense.., and to have the
jury properly instructed on any legal defense supported by the evidence. 272
The court went on to say "[t]hese rights stand for naught if the prosecutor
265. 712 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
266. Id. at 452.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Miller, 712 So. 2d at 452-53.
271. Id. at 453.
272. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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can ridicule a defense so presented, denigrate the accused for his temerity in
raising the issue, and misstate the law in contradiction of the judge's
instructions, as the prosecutor in this case did. 273 The court concluded that
the prosecutor's misconduct was a "foul blow" and deprived the defendant
of his fundamental right to a fair trial.
2 74
11. Improper Penalty-Phase Arguments
"[P]rosecutorial misconduct in the penalty phase must be egregious to
warrant vacating the sentence and remanding for a new penalty phase
proceeding." 27 In Urbin v. State,276 the defendant was found guilty of first-
degree murder and robbery and was sentenced to death. The Supreme
Court of Florida affirmed the conviction but reversed the death sentence
based on proportionality. 8 Although the defense had failed to object to the
prosecutor's penalty-phase argument and the issue was moot because of the
proportionality reversal, the Supreme Court of Florida said it was obligated
to acknowledge and disapprove of improprieties in the prosecutor's closing
penalty-phase argument. 279-
The Supreme Court of Florida was particularly concerned that the
prosecutor had invited the jury to disregard the law. 0 The prosecutor
improperly asserted that if the defendant received a life sentence, they might
still release him some day."' The prosecutor argued:
I anticipate that the defense lawyer is going to argue for you-
argue to you to recommend the life sentence. They're going to
argue that life without parole is what you ought to recommend.
And I submit to you today now that is the state of the law, life
without parole. We all know in the past laws have changed. And
we all know that in the future laws can change. The law now is
life without parole. 
2
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 359 (Fla. 1988).
276. 714 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1998).
277. Id. at 413.
278. Id. at 418.
279. Id. at 418-19.
280. Id. at 420.
281. Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 420.
282. Id. at 420 n.10 (emphasis added).
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The court said the prosecutor was "encourag[ing] the jury to reject the
only lawful alternative to the death penalty, even if they believed that to be
the right recommendation, based on a reflexive fear that, regardless of the
law, [the defendant] might someday be eligible for parole. ' 3 The court
found the prosecutor's "ignore the law" argument had absolutely no place in
a trial.284 The prosecutor aggravated the matter more when he argued:
[M~y concern is that some of you may be tempted to take the easy
way out, to not weigh the aggravating circumstances and the
mitigating circumstances and not want to fully carry out your
responsibility and just vote for life.... I'm going to ask you not be
swayed by pity or sympathy. I'm going to ask you what pity, what
sympathy, what mercy did the defendant show [the victim]. ... I'm
going to ask you to follow the law. I'm going to ask you to do your
duty.28
5
The Supreme Court of Florida noted that the prosecutor's argument was
similar to a case in which the First District Court of Appeal had condemned
the argument as "an impermissible attempt by the prosecution to instruct the
jury as to its duties and functions."' 6 The prosecutor went beyond the
evidence when he stated the "victim was shot while 'pleading for his
life." '287 The court found that this type of argument was an impermissible
emotional appeal and constituted a "subtle 'golden rule' argument."' ' 8 The
prosecutor put his own words in the victim's mouth by saying "[d]on't hurt
me. Take my money, take my jewelry. Don't hurt me." The court found
these imaginary words were an attempt by the prosecutor to "'unduly create,
arouse and inflame the sympathy, prejudice and passions of [the] jury to the
detriment of the accused."' 2
The court then addressed the prosecutor's verbal attack on the
defendant's mother.291 The prosecutor called the defendant's mother a
"mistress of excuses" three times and criticized her because she never
expressed any concern, remorse, or sorrow to the victim's family.29 The
283. Id. at 420.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 421.
286. Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 421 (citing Redish v. State, 525 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1988)).
287. Id. at 421.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. (quoting Barnes v. State, 58 So. 2d 157, 159 (Fla. 1951)).
291. Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 421.
292. Id. at 421.
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court explained that "[t]hese attacks could only serve to prejudice [the
defendant] for any animosity that may have been aroused in the jury for
[defendant's] mother, hence essentially turning the substantial mitigation of
parental neglect against [defendant]." 293 The court also found the prosecutor
improperly concluded his argument by stating:
If you are tempted to show this defendant mercy, if you are
tempted to show him pity, I'm going to ask you to do this, to show
him the same amount of mercy, the same amount of pity that he
showed [the victim] on September 1, 1995, and that was none.29
4
Mercy arguments are impermissible because they are "'an unnecessary
appeal to the sympathies of the juror calculated to influence their sentence
recommendation.",
295
VIII. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, despite warnings, admonitions, and appellate court
reversals, misconduct continues, showing that some trial attorneys ignore the
requirement for professional and ethical conduct in the courtroom.2 9 To halt
unethical conduct, appellate courts appear more willing to take serious
action against the attorney and forward instances of misconduct to The
Florida Bar for disciplinary proceedings. 297
Judge Altenbernd recently proposed a solution to misconduct during
closing argument:
298
[T]he state attorneys, the public defenders, and the circuit court
judges, at a statewide level, need to create a continuing legal
education videotape for prosecutors and a separate video tape for
defense attorneys, demonstrating improper closing arguments that
are against the rules and should never be made. Each new attorney
who practices in criminal court should be required to view these
tapes before the attorney is allowed to try a case. When an attorney
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. (quoting Rhodes v. State, 547 So. 2d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 1989)).
296. See Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 422.
297. See Barnes v. State, 743 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Del Rio v. State,
732 So. 2d 1100, 1102 n.1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Izquierdo v. State, 724 So. 2d 124, 125
n.1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
298. Bell v. State, 723 So. 2d 896, 897 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (Altenbemd, A.CJ.,
specially concurring).
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violates the rules for the first time in closing argument, the trial
judge should be encouraged to require the attorney to view the tape
again. After two or three viewings, if an attorney still cannot argue
within the rules, other more serious sanctions should be imposed
either by a supervising attorney or by the trial court. Given the
seriousness of these trials and the ramifications of appellate court
reversals, the public, the victims of crime, and the defendants
deserve no less. 299
"'If attorneys do not recognize improper argument, they should not be
in a courtroom. If trial attorneys recognize improper argument and persist in
its use, they should not be members of The Florida Bar.' ' 300 "[Y]ou can win
your cases, you can win the tough ones, but you have to do it with dignity
and with honor .... We are a noble and honorable profession."30 1
299. Id. at 897.
300. Id. (quoting Luce v. State, 642 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (Leblue, J.,
specially concurring)).
301. Honorable Gerald Kogan, Keynote Address at the Nova Law Review Annual
Banquet (Mar. 29, 1996), (emphasis added), reprinted in Honorable Gerald Kogan, Keynote
Address at the Annual Nova Law Review Banquet Mar. 29, 1996, 24 NOVAL. REV. 1, 4 (1996).
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